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ENABLING FAMILIES TO WEATHER 
EMERGENCIES AND DEVELOP 
The Role of Assets 
Low-wage jobs can be unstable, leaving families struggling to cope with employment gaps and financial 
emergencies that can strike without warning. Such means-tested social programs as Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) and Food Stamps and such social insurance programs as Unemployment Insurance 
can help families weather hard times, but not all families are eligible for these benefits. For example, only 22 
percent of low-income families with an unemployed worker for some part of 2006 received unemployment 
insurance benefits. Further, these program benefits may not cover families’ rent, utilities, and food. One 
potential solution to this problem is asset building: savings and assets can help low-income families weather 
unexpected employment gaps or pay unexpected medical and car-repair bills, as well as realize such long-term 
goals as owning a home or financing retirement. This essay discusses low-income families’ needs for assets 
and examines promising policies aimed at addressing them. 
Asset Holdings of Low-Income Working Families  
Most low-income working families have too few assets to weather emergencies. Over three-quarters of low-
income working families are “asset poor”—without enough assets to finance consumption for three months 
at the federal income poverty level.1 Yet, unemployment spells average two to four months (Caner and Wolff 
2004; Vroman 2007). If only financial (i.e., liquid) assets are considered (e.g., savings, 401(k), bonds), then 
nearly 80 percent of low-income working families are asset poor2—highly vulnerable to eviction and other 
financial vagaries and assaults. The asset picture improves if net worth is considered, but it is still tenuous.3 In 
this case, just under half (44.9 percent) of low-income working families are asset poor. While an 
improvement, this still leaves roughly half of families in precarious financial situations. At the bottom of the 
asset totem pole, nearly 30 percent of low-income working families have zero or negative net worth. Overall, 
the median net worth among low-income working families is $6,565 (table 1). 
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Table 1. Asset Holdings for Low-Income Working Families, 2003 
Median Holdings by Income Percentile  Ownership 
percent Mean 25th 50th 75th 
Net worth 73.5%a $73,892 $0 $6,565 $56,350 
Bank accounts 56.5% $5,249 $180 $800 $3,000 
Retirement 
accounts 21.2% $26,016 $3,000 $10,000 $26,000 
Home equity 45.6% $87,227 $17,000 $45,000 $110,000 
Car equity 82.5% $3,583 $750 $3,700 $6,800 
Source: Author tabulations from wave 9 of the 2001 SIPP panel, conducted in 2003. 
Note: Low-income working families are families with children whose members worked at some point during the prior 
12 months and whose income is less than 200 percent of the federal poverty threshold. 
a “Ownership percent” for net worth is the percent of low-income working families with positive net worth. 
A closer look at low-income working families’ asset holdings reveals that the typical family has limited savings 
and does not own a home or have a retirement account. Many such families have no car. A slim majority 
(56.5 percent) of low-income working families has a bank account,4 but often it is too small—$800 is the 
median—to see a family through even a short employment gap or other financial emergency. These overall 
numbers mask asset differences by age, race, and family structure. The percentage of low-income working 
families with bank accounts, for example, differs by nearly 30 percentage points across racial and ethnic 
groups, from 67 percent for white families to 44 percent for Hispanic families and 38 percent for black 
families. Earnings among families with bank accounts also differ by demographic group. For family heads 
from age 30 to 39, the median is $707, rising to $1,460 for those age 50 to 60. Similarly, the median level of 
bank account savings is $305 for single female-headed families and $1,000 for two-parent families. 
Few in this population save for retirement. Only 21.2 percent of low-income working families report having 
any type of retirement account (table 1). Families headed by older adults are slightly more likely to have 
one—26 percent versus 17 percent. These accounts have a median value of $10,000— not much when spread 
out over an individual’s expected retirement years but not trivial as a defense against the unforeseen either. 
The value of families’ retirement savings varies by age, from roughly $6,000 for 30- to 39-year-olds to $23,000 
for 50- to 60-year-olds. Low retirement savings rates may reflect lack of an employer-sponsored retirement 
savings plan5 or the diversion of funds to more pressing needs. Also, fear of penalties for early withdrawals 
for bill-paying or other unauthorized uses of these funds may discourage saving for retirement. As Beverly, 
Schneider, and Tufano (2005) document, the most common savings goal among a sample of low-income tax 
filers in Tulsa, Oklahoma, was “general precautionary”—or rainy day—savings. Further, many of the tax 
benefits that better-off families enjoy for saving for retirement elude low-income families because their tax 
bills are relatively low. 
Homeownership is more prevalent than retirement savings among low-income working families. Nearly half 
(45.6 percent) own a home, and the median value of home equity for these homeowners is $45,000 (table 1). 
Homeownership among low-income working families differs substantially by race and ethnicity. While 56 
percent of white families own a home, only 38 percent of Hispanic and 25 percent of black families do so. 
For the U.S. population, homeownership rates increased steadily between 1994 and 2004 but have since 
decreased with the current housing crisis. In 2007, homeownership rates fell below 2003 rates.6
Most (82.5 percent) low-income working families own a car, with a median value of $3,700 (table 1). While 
only a small minority of families do not have a vehicle, a vehicle can be necessary to get and keep jobs. This 
disadvantage has become more pronounced as many jobs have moved from cities to suburbs, where public 
transportation is more limited and less reliable.7  
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The Government’s Role in Asset Building 
Double-edged swords, federal and state government programs and policies can both promote and discourage 
families’ asset building. Such means-tested transfer programs as TANF and Food Stamps can discourage 
precautionary savings by providing families with benefits—basically, a consumption floor during economic 
emergencies. Asset tests associated with means-tested transfer programs can also discourage asset building: 
since only families with assets below a set threshold are eligible, it is tempting to spend down or keep 
financial assets below that line.8 The federal government historically set strict asset limits for means-tested 
program eligibility but relaxed them somewhat over the last decade, in part due to concerns that they 
discouraged savings.9
While liberalizing asset tests, federal and state governments also started promoting asset-building among low-
income families by supporting Individual Development Account (IDA) programs. Targeted at low-income 
families, these accounts allow participants to save for such specific approved purposes as higher education, 
homeownership, and business start-ups. IDA programs provide matching funds when families’ savings are 
withdrawn to spend on one of these preset goals. These programs have demonstrated that low-income 
families can and will save when provided with financial literacy (a mandatory component of the program) and 
given financial incentives (see McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Nam 2007; Mills et al. 2006; Schreiner and Sherraden 
2007; and Stegman and Faris 2005, among others). That said, spending on IDA programs represents just a 
tiny fraction (about one-tenth of 1 percent) of all federal spending aimed at promoting savings.  
The federal government subsidizes asset building mainly through the tax code. Taxpayers can deduct interest 
paid on mortgages and can shelter significant amounts of savings for retirement. Of the roughly $367 billion 
spent on asset-building policies in fiscal year 2005, more than 99 percent of the dollars dedicated took the 
form of tax breaks. Direct outlays for programs such as IDAs accounted for only 1 percent (Woo and 
Buchholz 2007).10 This subsidy structure primarily benefits high-income families since they have higher 
income tax liabilities. Conversely, many low-income families pay little or no income tax so miss out. Interest 
deductions, as one example, are available only to those who itemize their deductions, which further excludes 
low- and moderate-income taxpayers. In fact, in fiscal year 2005, less than 3 percent of the benefits from 
federal asset-building programs went to the bottom 60 percent of income households. The top 20 percent, in 
contrast, received nearly 90 percent of the benefits (Woo and Buchholz 2007). In general, federal spending 
supports long-term asset development—such as retirement savings and homeownership—and most low-
income working families do not hold long-term assets.  
Homeownership—most notably through subsidies to largely middle- and upper-income homeowners—has 
long enjoyed federal support. The major subsidies are the mortgage interest tax deduction, the property tax 
deduction, the exclusion of the net rental value due to equity, and the capital gains tax exclusion. But some 
policies primarily help low- and moderate-income families. The Community Reinvestment Act gives banks 
and thrifts responsibility for helping meet the credit needs of low- and moderate-income borrowers in their 
business areas. The Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act of 1980 effectively 
abolished usury laws (restrictions on interest rates) on first-lien mortgages. Along with technological 
advances, such as credit scoring, and the influence of capital markets, these policies opened up the subprime 
market and provided mortgage credit to higher risk low- and moderate-income borrowers (Gramlich 2007). 
Between 1994 and 2005, homeownership rates for African-American and Latino homebuyers rose 
impressively—from 42 to 49 percent for blacks and from 42 to 50 percent for Hispanics (Gramlich 2007). 
But this new subprime market grew without the regulation applied to the prime market, and these gains are 
now being eroded by forced home sales and foreclosures.  
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The Consequences of Low Asset Holdings 
Low asset holdings translate into difficulty meeting basic needs, lost opportunities for economic mobility, and 
missed chances to invest in children’s development and human capital. Paltry assets can also mean shortfalls 
that can destabilize or delay retirement. 
Without assets to draw on during emergencies, families must rely more on public supports and other outside 
help and struggle to meet basic needs. Many low-asset families have to resort to expensive short-term loans to 
survive a financial emergency. Once a vicious cycle of indebtedness takes hold, long-term asset goals 
evaporate. Conversely, with an asset cushion, families can enter into a virtuous circle of asset accumulation—
paying down debts, saving more, earning a credit rating, and, as but one example, afford a down payment on 
a home (Nam, Huang, and Sherraden forthcoming). 
Having fewer assets also means missing out on the many benefits that come with long-term asset 
development, whether from owning a home or a small business or from education and retirement. 
Homeownership and a good education can be springboards into the middle class and better child outcomes. 
For example, the empirical literature suggests that children in families who own their own homes reach higher 
educational levels and are less likely to become pregnant as teenagers (Lerman and McKernan forthcoming), 
most likely because homeownership increases residential stability. As for shorter-term benefits, a home or 
retirement savings can provide families leverage to borrow during emergencies by tapping into home equity 
lines of credit or retirement funds. Asset-holding and the increased job stability that goes hand in hand with a 
better education can boost credit ratings, which in turn can open up additional options for borrowing in an 
emergency and at lower interest rates. 
The Most Promising Policy Options 
Which asset-related policies would help low-income working families the most? First, families with few assets 
need access to small loans, preferably with a savings component, to help them weather bad patches. Then, 
they need to get a financial toehold to build the savings needed to avoid expensive short-term loans and to 
purchase a reliable car if one is needed to get to work. With emergency savings secured, families can move on 
to building assets for longer-term development, such as homeownership. Many asset policy proposals focus 
solely on longer-term development, pitting it against shorter-term financial goals, such as weathering a 
financial emergency. Our proposals try to resolve that counterproductive tension. 
Increase Competition for and Regulation of Small Loans 
If low-income working families have too few assets to weather emergencies, where do they turn for help? 
One third of low-income families without savings accounts report that they would use a payday lender or 
pawn something to pay a large bill in an emergency.11 Payday lenders, pawnbrokers, and auto-title lenders all 
tender small loans intended to carry borrowers through temporary cash shortages. Payday lenders, for 
example, provide short-term loans to working people with bank accounts. The typical payday loan is for 
roughly $250–$300 for two weeks, with fees of $15–$20 per $100 borrowed (Flannery and Samolyk 2005). 
Pawnbrokers and auto-title lenders also provide short-term loans but use collateral (such as jewelry or a car 
title) to secure them. Pawnbroker loans are typically a one-month loan under $100 (National Pawnbrokers 
Association 2008), and the typical auto-title loan is a one-month loan between $600 and $2,500 (South 
Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center 2004). Occasional use of such short-term loans can help families 
repair a car needed for commuting or pay for an unexpected medical need, but habitual use or reliance on 
short-term loans for extended periods can trigger a spiral of debt that hinders future asset building. 
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To better protect families using small loans, we recommend regulating small loans more strictly, developing 
new types of longer-term small loans, and encouraging the mainstream financial sector to offer small loans 
with a savings component. 
Increase Regulation of Small Loans  
Regulate standard, clear, and timely disclosures of the total loan cost so consumers know their full obligation 
and can easily compare what various lenders charge for loans.12 Stricter regulation coupled with standard and 
improved disclosures for consumers will increase competition within the alternative financial sector.13 And 
full disclosures, along with licensing, reporting, and examination requirements, could enhance the industry’s 
image and make the small loan business more appealing to both mainstream and alternative entrants.14  
The case for regulating fees or interest rates on small loans is less clear and warrants further research and 
consideration. Does regulating prices charged make fewer small, short-term loans available? Where will 
families who need these loans turn if they cannot get them? Flannery and Samolyk (2005) find that “fixed 
operating costs and loan loss rates do justify a large part of the high APRs [annualized rates of interest] 
charged on payday advance loans” (p. 1) and undermine APR-based claims of “excess” profits. If profits are 
not excessive, then regulating prices will limit availability. If profits are excessive, then the policies proposed 
here—regulating disclosures; requiring licensing, reporting, and examinations; and creating incentives for 
financial institutions to provide small loan services—should increase competition and drive prices down.  
Develop a Longer-Term Loan Product  
A longer-term loan product for habitual users—those who rely on short-term loans frequently or for long 
periods—is needed. Regulating disclosures and creating incentives for traditional financial institutions to 
provide small loans would create this product de facto. Sources such as Tele-Trak—which maintains records 
of people’s payday advances—or other centralized information can identify habitual users so they could be 
offered more affordable longer-term products and such services as financial counseling. 
Create Incentives for Traditional Financial Institutions to Provide Small Loans with Piggyback Savings  
Financial institutions may shy away from the research and product development needed to provide small 
loans, especially given the alternative financial sector’s unsavory image. The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s (FDIC’s) Pilot Project for Affordable Small-Dollar Loans proposes to demonstrate how small 
loans can increase the business of banks that reach out to underserved communities and develop new 
customers for mainstream banking services (Krimminger and Thompson 2007). In addition, the FDIC uses 
the Community Reinvestment Act as an incentive for lenders to provide small loans, preferably with a savings 
element. Lenders that pick up the gauntlet warrant favorable consideration for providing credit that responds 
to diverse community needs and for providing community development services. Governmental incentives 
like these that harness the market and expand access to financial services for low-income families are 
consistent with Barr’s general recommendation in his 2004 article “Banking the Poor.” 
Examples of mainstream small loan programs include (1) the North Carolina State Employees’ Credit 
Union’s Salary Advance Loan Program (SALO), (2) Citibank’s revolving lines of credit, and (3) the “Better 
Choice” program initiated in 2006 by the Pennsylvania Credit Union Association (Krimminger and 
Thompson 2007). SALO provides loans up to $500 with an interest rate of 18 percent and no fees. The loan 
plus accrued interest must be repaid by an automatic debit from the borrower’s account on his or her next 
pay date. Application and underwriting requirements are minimal. A family need only have a checking 
account, use direct deposit, and not be in bankruptcy. Under SALO’s savings component, every time a loan is 
made, 5 percent of the advance is deposited into an interest-accumulating savings account. The savings 
partially securitize the loan and encourage saving. SALO also has a partnership with a credit-counseling 
service, BALANCE, that offers financial education. BALANCE helps families restructure debt, budget, and 
develop money-management skills. Any borrower receiving more than three consecutive payday loans is 
referred to BALANCE.15 So far, SALO has served nearly 100,000 customers, saving them $145 million over 
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the cost of typical payday loans. And through the savings component, SALO program users have 
cumulatively put away more than $13.2 million (State Employees’ Credit Union 2008). 
Overall, our recommended policies should make small short-term loan options more transparent and less 
costly but still available for consumers with few other alternatives. We do not recommend eliminating these 
loans, which could be replaced by alternatives that make families even worse off. 
Costs: The reforms suggested here for increasing competition and regulation of small loans are regulatory and 
market-based and do not require a costly new government subsidy program. The increased federal regulation 
called for will require additional resources to enforce, but licensing, reporting, and lender scrutiny need not 
require federal government financing. Indeed, a tradition in the banking world is for regulated financial 
institutions to pay examination costs. Increased federal regulation of nonbanks, such as small loan providers, 
would level the playing field between banks and nonbanks while increasing consumer protection. 
Incentivize Savings for Low-Income Families  
Incentivized savings can help low-income working families get a toehold in the financial world and increase 
financial literacy. Incentivized savings accounts—such as children’s savings accounts and IDAs—could bank 
low-income working families who would not otherwise have accounts, enhance financial education, and 
encourage asset building.16 Children’s accounts are subsidized savings accounts given to children at birth, 
typically with an initial deposit from the government. Children’s accounts have been proposed in the United 
States and implemented in the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Korea. The proposed America Saving for 
Personal Investment, Retirement, and Education Act (ASPIRE Act) in the United States would provide every 
child with a $500 account at birth and an additional $500 if he or she lives in a low-income family (New 
America Foundation 2007). IDAs are matched savings accounts strictly for home purchase and repair, 
postsecondary education, microenterprise, and retirement.  
As financial education tools, incentivized accounts allow families and children to see first hand the value of 
compound interest (Butrica et al. 2008). That alone may improve financial acumen, but combined with some 
financial training through schools or as currently mandated in IDA programs, these accounts could be even 
more effective. Research suggests that fewer than 10 hours of such training is optimal (Schreiner and 
Sherraden 2007). 
Incentivized savings accounts encourage asset building by matching family savings deposited into accounts. 
Such matched savings may be an important way to redirect some of the substantial savings-promoting tax 
subsidies that currently go mostly to high-income families. 
Create and Match Savings in Children’s Accounts  
Our children’s account proposal has five key elements: 
 Children’s accounts would be provided to all children at birth, with an initial government deposit of $500. 
Unlike restricting accounts to children in low-income families, this universal approach gives financial 
institutions a stronger incentive to offer savings accounts with small balances. 
 Families, friends, and charities would be permitted to contribute private donations to the accounts, but 
such donations would not receive any tax advantages. 
 Low-income families would be encouraged to save through a dollar-for-dollar government match on the 
first $1,000 contributed.  
 Children’s account funds need not be used until the child turns 18; they can then be used for any 
purpose. Unrestricted use after age 18 will reduce administrative costs below those with proposals (such 
as the ASPIRE Act) that restrict use to college expenses, home-buying, or retirement and will also enable 
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new adult account holders to use funds to weather such exigencies as a financial setback or 
unemployment spell.  
 Children’s account government grants and the interest they earn receive tax preference only for low-
income families. Simulations of the differential effects of key children’s accounts features suggest that 
making these accounts nontaxable for all benefits higher-income families much more than low-income 
families (Butrica et al. 2008). 
Our proposal for children’s accounts resembles that proposed by the ASPIRE Act (New America 
Foundation 2007) and the Aspen Institute (2005), and all three proposals are modeled to some extent after 
the United Kingdom’s children’s accounts. The Child Trust Fund provides each child born in the United 
Kingdom after September 2002 with £250 and another £250 if he or she lives in a lower-income family 
(Cramer 2006). Our proposal differs from the others, however, in making children’s accounts tax free only 
for low-income families, not all families. Another difference is that we do not recommend giving low-income 
families an additional $500 at birth since doing so would too often benefit higher-income families who just 
happened to have low incomes the year their child was born (Butrica et al. 2008).  
Costs: Estimated costs for the ASPIRE Act and Aspen Institute proposals range from $2.1 to $3.25 billion in 
the first year and from $26.6 to $37.5 billion over 10 years (Aspen Institute 2007, 18; Cramer 2006, 36). These 
estimates are likely an upper bound for our proposal because only low-income families would get tax 
preference on government grants and interest earned. 
Expand Incentivized Accounts through an EITC Savers Bonus  
How can the benefits of incentivized savings accounts be extended to more than families with newborn 
children, and what is the best way to scale up current IDA programs? We recommend matching federal 
earned income tax credit (EITC) dollars that are deposited into longer-term savings accounts or used to buy 
U.S. savings bonds. In both cases, the federal government match would automatically go into the longer-term 
savings product and could not take the form of a higher tax refund that could be spent.17 The EITC refund 
provides an important opportunity for low-income families to save. As a refundable income tax credit, it both 
reduces a person’s tax liability and allows refunds larger than the income tax liability. Recognizing this as an 
opportunity for families to save, in 2007 the federal government began allowing taxpayers to deposit their 
refund directly into up to three accounts, thus allowing families to decide how much to save before they gain 
access to the money.18  
To give low-income families incentives to save their federal EITC and continue to build other assets, 
 the EITC would be matched dollar for dollar by the government up to $200 a year when deposited 
directly into specified types of longer-term savings accounts (e.g., IDAs, children’s accounts, IRAs, 529 
plans);19  
 the EITC would be matched dollar for dollar when used to buy a U.S. savings bond. The bond option 
allows those who do not have savings vehicles with the routing and account number necessary for direct 
deposit—or access to a commercial firm that allows people to open savings vehicles when they file their 
taxes—to take advantage of the match. While it is not currently possible to purchase a U.S. saving bond 
directly from a tax refund, it was between 1962 and 1968; and  
 families would continue to have immediate access to their IDA, so they can use it to withstand an 
emergency, but they receive no match for funds withdrawn early. Savings bonds must be held for at least 
one year.20 
Expanding incentivized savings accounts through universal children’s accounts and a matched EITC refund 
would bring the benefits of these accounts to more low-income working families and reduce the cost of the 
accounts. Experimental and nonexperimental research on Individual Development Accounts has shown that 
IDA programs increase asset accumulation (Schreiner et al. 2005; U.S. Department of Health and Human 
ENABLING FAMILIES TO WEATHER EMERGENCIES AND DEVELOP 7
Services 2004; Stegman and Faris 2005; Mills et al. 2006) and that matching savings deposits seems to attract 
and hold participants (Sherraden 2007). However, today’s community-based IDA programs are costly to run 
(Sherraden 2007). Moving incentivized savings programs out of community-based organizations and into a 
government-based model (as proposed in the ASPIRE Act) or a private financial sector–based model with 
government oversight (as proposed in the Aspen Institute’s Child Accounts proposal of 2007) will reduce 
costs. 
Costs: The EITC match is expected to cost between $1.5 billion and $3.0 billion a year. The lower bound 
estimate assumes that one-third of EITC recipients take the full match, while the upper bound assumes two-
thirds do.21 The cost of the proposed EITC match could be offset by the saver’s credit, which is a tax credit 
that promotes retirement savings and costs the federal government over $900 million dollars a year.22 The 
saver’s credit is not refundable so provides little incentive for many low-income families to save. Further, the 
credit is given in the form of a tax refund that could be spent on anything upon receipt, so it does not create 
further incentives to save. 
Support Car Ownership  
Access to a reliable automobile can be important for finding and keeping a job. Many employers are located 
outside city centers, beyond the reach of good or even any public transportation. Indeed, two-thirds of new 
jobs are located in the suburbs (Waller 2005a). Although most low-income working families (82 percent) own 
a car, roughly 2 million do not. Cars can make it easier for low-income families to cope with emergencies, 
allowing workers easier access to more employers (to, say, fill out more applications), consider employers not 
located near public transportation, and work late-night shifts. Indeed, research suggests that car ownership 
may boost employment and earnings (Lucas and Nicholson 2003 and Ong 2002 as cited in Waller 2005b).23 
True, new cars quickly depreciate and older cars can cost a lot to maintain. Even gas, insurance, and run-of-
the-mill repairs can strain household finances. Yet, given the tough commutes carless families can have, the 
benefits of car ownership can far outweigh the costs.  
Many low-income families consider a car a necessity (to get to work and medical appointments or to buy 
groceries) and turn to subprime auto loans to finance its purchase. These loans have high annual interest rates 
and high default rates, so providing less burdensome auto-financing alternatives can lead to better credit 
scores and increase the likelihood that low-income families become integrated into the formal financial sector. 
We recommend two proposals to support car ownership: (1) allowing IDAs and other incentivized accounts 
to be used for vehicle purchase and upkeep and (2) setting up a national grants program to help low-income 
families purchase and maintain vehicles. These proposals can be implemented separately or together, and 
both channel benefits directly to low-income families, instead of spreading them out across families in all 
income brackets.  
Allow IDAs and Other Incentivized Accounts to Be Used for Vehicle Ownership 
IDA programs mostly support long-term asset development, such as homeownership, business start-up, and 
higher education. In today’s economy and work environment, vehicle ownership and maintenance belong on 
this list too. In 2007, the House of Representatives introduced a bill, Creating Access to Rides Act (H.R. 
3599), that would allow IDAs established under the Assets for Independence Act to be used to purchase or 
maintain an automobile or to purchase automobile insurance. Our proposal differs by disallowing matched 
IDA savings to be spent on automobile insurance and capping the amount that can be withdrawn and 
matched at $3,000 to discourage low-income families from overspending on cars. With an average match rate 
of roughly two to one for IDA programs (Nam, Ratcliffe, and McKernan forthcoming), a $3,000 withdrawal 
would provide low-income families with roughly $9,000 to purchase or put a down payment on an 
automobile. 
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This proposal affords low-income families a new way to save for and obtain a reliable automobile without 
turning to the expensive and risky subprime loan market—vital for families with little to spare for a down 
payment or with a poor or sparse credit history. Subprime loans can have annual interest rates of 25 to 30 
percent, and more than half of them default (Adams, Einav, and Levin 2007). By avoiding the subprime loan 
market and using savings from incentivized accounts to purchase an automobile or make a sizable down 
payment, low-income families can put themselves in a better financial position. Our proposal also encourages 
them to open an incentivized account and begin saving, giving them a financial foothold that may lead to 
further savings for longer-run objectives.  
Costs: If families simply buy a car instead of purchasing something else on the list of preset program goals, 
then adding vehicle purchase to the approved list will entail no additional costs. But should, for example, 
people use savings in incentivized accounts to purchase a vehicle under current law (and thus not receive the 
match), expanding the list of preset goals to include vehicle purchase will raise program costs by increasing 
the number of IDA participants who receive the match. Still, since total spending on incentivized accounts is 
small (about $40 million a year and less than 0.01 percent of federal spending on asset building), potential cost 
increases due to greater take-up of the match are also relatively small. If expanding preset goals increased 
program costs by 10 percent, federal spending would rise by only $4.0 million a year. 
Set up a National Grants Program to Help Low-Income Families Purchase and Repair Vehicles  
We recommend setting up a national grants program that would provide federal funds to create or enlarge 
car-ownership programs designed to help low-income families purchase and repair cars. The grants would be 
competitively awarded to states, Indian tribes and tribal organizations, localities, and nonprofits. Program 
participation would be limited to families with incomes below 200 percent of the federal poverty threshold. 
These grants could also be used to add a car-ownership component to programs that already serve other 
needs of low-income families (e.g., employment and training programs). Also, these grants would include an 
evaluation component. As a first step, we recommend the federal government appropriate $50 million to this 
program annually for five years. This proposal is similar in design to the national grants program included in 
the 2007 Creating Access to Rides Act (H.R. 3599): this proposed program is not big enough to help all low-
income working families in need of a car, but the required program evaluation should give policymakers the 
information needed to decide whether and how to support additional or expanded programs. 
Most current car-ownership programs are small. Some programs have been set up using TANF funds while 
others are supported by state and local governments. The elements of these programs differ across programs 
and include (1) selling and leasing donated cars, (2) providing interest-free or low cost loans, and (3) helping 
participants with their down payment, insurance and inspection costs, and a maintenance plan. Programs that 
help low-income families obtain a reliable car and provide assistance with costs for such necessities as 
insurance and repairs can go a long way toward increasing a family’s employment prospects and ability to 
weather emergencies. By providing low-cost loans and keeping families out of the subprime market, these 
programs can help families build and improve their credit histories and scores. This, in turn, can help families 
obtain future loans for cars or such longer-term investments as higher education or a home in the prime loan 
market.  
Costs: The program proposed here would cost $250 million over five years—$50 million in each of the five 
years—and would be funded out of general revenues. While $250 million is a significant sum, it is tiny relative 
to the $367 billion spent on asset-building programs in the United States. Minor changes in other asset-
building policies would free up funds for this program. 
Incentivize and Protect Homeownership  
Make Homeownership Tax Subsidies More Progressive  
Federal spending on homeownership programs was roughly $116.6 billion in 2005, and 99 percent was in the 
form of tax subsidies. As discussed above, subsidies provided as tax breaks mostly benefit high-income 
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families. Sixty percent of the two largest homeownership expenditures—the mortgage interest deduction and 
deductions for property taxes—for instance, go to households in the top 10 percent by income, while the 
bottom 50 percent of households gets less than 3 percent (Woo and Buchholz 2007). 
The mortgage interest deduction is by far the largest single component of homeownership expenditures, 
composing more than 60 percent of federal spending on homeownership subsidies ($72.6 billion in 2005). 
Tax filers can deduct the amount of interest they pay on their home mortgage from their adjusted gross 
income if they itemize their deductions. Interest paid on mortgages up to $1 million can be deducted from 
taxable income. Partly because it subsidizes debt instead of assets, this tax benefit has had little effect on 
homeownership rates, but it provides incentives for the purchase of bigger and more expensive homes (Gale, 
Gruber, and Stephens-Davidowitz 2007). Low- and moderate-income families benefit less from the mortgage 
interest deduction because they tend to purchase less expensive homes and are less likely to itemize their 
deductions (Carasso 2005). 
Owning a home is often considered the “American dream,” and monthly mortgage payments are a key way 
families build home equity and increase their wealth. Making the mortgage interest deduction more 
progressive could promote homeownership among low- and moderate-income families. However, any 
restructuring must carefully consider the economic consequences on the real estate market (e.g., housing 
prices) and the ability of current homeowners to meet their payments. Eliminating the mortgage interest 
deduction, for example, could make it very difficult or impossible for homeowners to make their payments 
and cripple the housing market. There are clear tensions in any proposal that redirects homeownership 
subsidies away from upper-income families toward low- and moderate-income families, and any redirection 
should be phased in over time. While we do not present a specific proposal here, changes in the structure and 
design of homeownership programs should be seriously considered in the public debate.24
Increase Oversight of Nonbanks  
Low- and moderate-income families trying to buy homes need better protections than they now receive. 
These families typically pose greater credit risks than higher-income families do (due to less stable 
employment and other factors) and so are more likely to finance their home mortgages outside of banks. 
These alternative lenders originate most subprime loans but receive less federal oversight and supervision 
than banks—perhaps one reason the current credit crisis originated in the subprime market. What measures 
will help prevent the next credit debacle and protect low-income working families? We believe the answer is 
increased regulation of lenders that are not banks.25  
Commercial banks and thrifts undergo rigorous bank examinations from their regulators—the Office of 
Controller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and 
the Federal Reserve Board. In each bank, teams of examiners study lending records and Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) reports, and check for lending discrimination and lender diligence in evaluating 
borrowers’ ability to make mortgage payments. “Nonbanks” (or independents) are regulated by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) and undergo no bank examinations. In Subprime Mortgages: American’s Latest Boom 
and Bust, former governor of the Federal Reserve System Ned Gramlich recommends increased supervision 
of lenders and brokers to better protect subprime borrowers and avoid the next credit meltdown. Here, we 
propose aligning federal regulation of nonbank mortgage lenders with current regulations for banks. As 
Gramlich recommends, examinations for nonbanks could include evaluation of the borrower’s ability to pay 
using the published maximum rate on an adjustable rate mortgage, not the short-term teaser rate. And the 
safety and soundness provisions already applied to banks could be extended to nonbanks because loans with 
large implicit payment shocks can trigger widespread defaults and damage financial and housing markets. 
Unlike the law-enforcement model currently used by the FTC to regulate nonbanks, rigorous examination 
brings results and improvements behind the scenes without resort to a federal lawsuit. Examiners can spot 
red flags (such as loans that do not document the borrower’s ability to pay) and raise them before problems 
grow or multiply. Only in severe cases would it be necessary to sue a lender to resolve consumer protection 
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issues. Examiners would have reason to conduct site visits and exams in all nonbanks. Under the current FTC 
law-enforcement model, site visits are difficult and the FTC lacks regular and easy access to data. Most 
lenders have no contact with the FTC, while the few that do fear being singled out and tarred as a warning to 
other lenders.  
Costs: If the Federal Trade Commission continues to be the federal law enforcer for nonbanks, then it needs 
the resources to undertake meaningful bank examinations. Currently, the roughly 20 attorneys in the FTC’s 
Division of Financial Practices and a few economists in the Bureau of Economics are responsible for 
enforcing the law (with regional office assistance) for most subprime mortgage lenders, fraud, false 
advertising, payment systems, and more.26 On balance, increased federal regulation of nonbanks would level 
the playing field between banks and nonbanks while increasing consumer protection. And, as noted, regulated 
financial institutions traditionally shoulder the cost of examinations. 
Promote Retirement Savings through Automatic IRAs 
Nearly half of U.S. workers do not have an employer-sponsored savings plans, such as 401(k) plans. 
Employer-sponsored savings plans allow workers to easily save for retirement. Without such plans, workers 
may find it harder to maneuver the system (say, figure out how to open an individual retirement account, or 
IRA). Easy access to a retirement savings plan could help workers save for retirement and make the post-
earning years more financially secure. This is particularly relevant for low-wage workers because they are less 
likely than higher-wage workers to have an employer-sponsored retirement plan. Further, retirement savings 
among low-income working families is very low—only 21 percent have any retirement savings (see table 1). 
We recommend that the federal government enact legislation to create automatic IRAs. Automatic IRAs, 
introduced in 2007 in both the House of Representatives (H.R. 2167) and the Senate (S. 1141), could greatly 
help low-wage workers save for retirement.27 With this program, employers that do not offer an employer-
provided savings plan would use their payroll system to automatically deposit a portion of employers’ 
earnings into an IRA. The default contribution rate would be 1 percent of earnings, but it could be as high as 
8 percent.28 To compensate employers for the cost of setting up direct deposit into IRAs, they would receive 
a tax credit.29 A key program feature is that employees would be “automatically” enrolled in the program. 
That is, any employee who did not want to participate in the program would have to take steps to opt out. 
This is an important design feature, as automatic enrollment in 401(k) programs have been found to 
substantially increase 401(k) participation (Choi et al. 2004; Madrian and Shea 2001). 
Automatic IRAs could significantly improve the well-being of low-income families in retirement. Research 
suggests that after 30 years of contributing 3 percent of earnings to one of these accounts, a low-income 
person might have $20,000 dollars for retirement (Schmitt and Xanthopoulos 2007). Additional benefits 
would be improved credit scores and better odds of qualifying for a loan (e.g., a car loan or home mortgage). 
Although designed for other purposes, these accounts could also help low-income families weather 
emergencies. While there is a 10-percent penalty on early withdrawals from IRAs, and early withdrawals 
should be discouraged, these accounts could provide a necessary cushion in an economic crisis. There are, 
however, potential drawbacks to the proposed program. For example, a low-income family might increase its 
credit card debt to purchase necessities while saving in an IRA—a net loss given high interest rates on credit 
card debt. We set the default rate at 1 percent (versus 3 percent in H.R. 2167 and S. 1141) to lessen the 
potential downsides of the program. On balance, automatic IRAs promise to improve the asset position, 
credit scores, and long-term economic well-being of low-income families. 
Costs: Two costs are associated with this proposal: (1) the employer tax credit and (2) reductions in individual 
income tax liability. An analysis of automatic IRAs by Schmitt and Xanthopoulos (2007) suggests that the 
employer tax credit would cost roughly $250 million over 10 years (or an average of $25 million a year). This 
proposal would also lower federal revenues by reducing individual income tax liability since, under current 
law, IRA savings are not subject to federal income tax. These reductions occur because families save a 
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portion of earning in a tax-preferred account that is currently available, not because this proposal sets up a 
new tax preferred savings option. Schmitt and Xanthopoulos estimate that instituting automatic IRAs with a 
default contribution rate of 3 percent of earnings would reduce federal revenue by $2.5 to $5 billion over 10 
years (or an average of $250 to $500 million each year). Because our proposal has a lower default rate (1 
percent versus 3 percent), the Schmitt and Xanthopoulos estimates are upper-bound estimates of the federal 
tax revenue losses that would result from our proposal. 
The Short- and Long-Term Benefits for Families and Children 
This essay proposes five complementary types of asset policies that enable families to weather emergencies 
and promote their long-term development: 
1. Increase regulation of small loans, preferably with a savings component, to help families with few assets 
weather an emergency.  
2. Match children’s accounts and EITC savings (when deposited into longer-term savings accounts, such as 
IDAs, or when used to buy U.S. savings bonds) to incentivize savings, help low-income working families 
get a toehold in the financial world, and increase financial literacy.  
3. Allow incentivized savings accounts to be used for vehicle ownership and set up a national grants 
program to expand ownership of reliable vehicles.  
4. Modify the mortgage interest tax deduction and increase oversight of “nonbanks” so low-income 
working families receive some of the same incentives and protections that higher-income families receive 
when buying a home.  
5. Promote retirement savings through automatic IRAs to provide low-income working families with easy 
access to a retirement savings mechanism and thus a more secure retirement. 
Not all the proposals presented here require additional federal funds. Relying on a longstanding banking 
tradition, our proposals to intensify competition for and regulation of small loans and to increase oversight of 
nonbanks call on loan providers to pay for the increased oversight costs. This same tradition justifies our 
nongovernment financing design.  
Our proposals to incentivize savings for low-income families are our most costly recommendations—totaling 
$4.2 to $6.8 billion a year. Children’s accounts are estimated to cost an average of $2.7 to $3.8 billion a year 
over 10 years, and the EITC savers bonus is estimated to cost $1.5 to $3.0 billion a year.  
Promoting retirement savings through automatic IRAs is the next most expensive proposal, costing an 
estimated average of $275 to $525 million a year over 10 years. Most of this funding ($250 to $500 million a 
year) takes the form of reduced tax revenues due to increased savings in tax-preferred accounts (i.e., IRAs). 
The revenue reductions occur because automatic IRAs make it easier for individuals to save in these existing 
tax preferred accounts, not because our proposal sets up a new tax-preferred savings option.  
Proposed spending on car ownership programs is more modest. Allowing IDAs to be used for vehicle 
ownership would cost an estimated $4 million a year, while the national grants program to help low-income 
families purchase and repair a vehicle costs $50 million a year. Taken together, the two proposals total $4.5 
million to $7.4 billion a year and could be offset by eliminating or modifying current policies that do little to 
encourage asset building, such as the saver’s credit or the mortgage interest-tax deduction. Our proposals are 
modest even without offsetting the cost when compared with the roughly $400 billion currently spent on 
asset-building policies. 
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These proposed policies aimed at asset building have both short-term and long-term benefits. The policies 
that focus on weathering emergencies (such as those for small loans and automobiles) help tide families over 
when they need a short-term loan to pay for an unexpected medical bill or car repair, but also help families in 
the long run by improving financial security, improving credit history, moving families into the mainstream 
financial market, and improving long-term job stability and success. The policies designed to promote longer-
term financial security—mainly through homeownership and retirement savings—could be springboards into 
the middle class and better child outcomes. In addition, these assets provide low-income working families 
with additional options to borrow in emergencies, from home equity lines of credit, retirement funds, and as a 
result of the better credit ratings that are associated with holding assets. By focusing on both families’ short-
term needs and long-term development, these policies could improve low-income working families’ 
immediate prospects and long-term well-being. 
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The authors thank Ajay Chaudry, Reid Cramer, James Lacko, Robert Lerman, Margaret Simms, Eugene Steuerle, Margery Turner, 
Peggy Twohig, and Sheila Zedlewski for advice and comments, and Seth Zimmerman and Katie Vinopal for excellent research 
assistance.  
1 This commonly used asset poverty definition does not capture asset poverty from an assets-for-development perspective, where the 
amount needed to own a home or another measure may be more relevant (Nam, Huang, and Sherraden forthcoming). 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the data presented in this section (including table 1) capture assets held in 2003 and are based on the 
authors’ tabulations from wave 9 of the 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) panel. The numbers reported are 
for low-income working families, defined as families with children under age 18 whose members worked at some time during the 
prior 12 months and whose income is less than 200 percent of the federal poverty threshold. 
3 Net worth includes families’ net financial assets (e.g., savings, 401(k), bonds) as well as their net nonfinancial assets (e.g., vehicle, 
business, and home equity). 
4 This 2003 Survey of Income and Program Participation estimate for low-income working families is low relative to the 2004 Survey 
of Consumer Finances, which reports that 75 percent of bottom-quintile families have a transaction account, such as a checking or 
savings account (Bucks, Kennickel, and Moore 2006). 
5 As discussed below, nearly half of U.S. workers do not have an employer-sponsored retirement savings plan, such as a 401(k) plan. 
6 U.S. Census Bureau, “Housing Vacancies and Homeownership” (CPS/HVS) Annual Statistics 2007 Table 20, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual07/ann07t20.html. 
7 The asset holdings of the low-income working families are generally low when compared with all families. Data from the 2004 
Survey of Consumer Finances show that when considering all families, 91.3 percent have a transaction account, 49.7 percent have a 
retirement account, 69.1 percent own a home, and 86.3 percent own a vehicle (Bucks et al. 2006).  
8 See O’Brien (forthcoming) for a qualitative analysis of asset limits and welfare recipients’ savings behavior. 
9 The 1996 federal welfare reform legislation gave states the authority to create TANF asset limits, eliminating the federal asset limits 
that existed under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, which were only $1,000 for liquid assets and $1,500 for 
vehicle assets. This change led to increases in TANF asset limits. Between 1993 and 2003, for example, unrestricted asset limits more 
than doubled in real terms (from $1,139 to $2,587, in 2000 dollars) and 25 states implemented policies to exempt at least one vehicle 
when determining program eligibility (McKernan, Ratcliffe, and Nam 2007). More recently, the federal government took steps to 
liberalize the Food Stamp Program asset limits in the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the Farm Bill). 
10 The president’s fiscal year 2009 budget proposes to spend over $400 billion on asset-building policies (Cramer, O’Brien, and Lopez-
Fernandini 2008). 
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11 Urban Institute tabulations of families earning less than $30,000 from the Making Connections Survey. The Making Connections 
Cross-Site Survey is a product of the Annie E. Casey Foundation. For more information, see “Making Connections FAQ” at 
http://www.aecf.org/MajorInitiatives/MakingConnections/FAQs.aspx. 
12 The total cost of lending should be disclosed as one or two numbers, in a standardized form, totaling all fees for a loan of the stated 
duration. One total cost could be stated for a set loan amount of two-week duration, another for the same loan amount for a one-
month duration, and so on. Stating the fee as a dollar amount instead of or in addition to the annual percentage rate (APR) may be 
easier for consumers to understand on short-term loans. 
13 Research suggests that disclosure laws can improve outcomes. McKernan, Lacko, and Hastak (2003) find that disclosing the total 
cost of rent-to-own transactions makes consumers less likely to purchase through rent-to-own, and Lacko and Pappalardo (2007) 
demonstrate that disclosures can significantly improve consumer understanding of loan terms. 
14 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides guidelines for payday lending examination requirements. See FDIC, 
“Guidelines for Payday Lending,” http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/payday/.  
15 “State Employees Credit Union–Salary Advance Program (SALO),” http://www.ncua.gov/PALS/BP/PALSDocs/66310-
46,113,116,135.htm. 
16 Incentivized savings accounts, such as IDAs and children’s accounts, were first proposed by Sherraden (1991). 
17 The New America Foundation formally proposed an EITC savers bonus in 2006 (Boshara et al. 2006; Boshara, Cramer, and 
O’Brien 2007) and has provided congressional testimony on the bonus 
(http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=6063). The Foundation’s proposal allows the tax filer to receive 
the bonus directly (although states that the bonus would ideally be deposited directly into the savings product). Our proposal, on the 
other hand, requires the bonus be automatically directed to the longer-term savings product. 
One potential issue with our proposal is that recipients could withdraw matched funds after they are deposited into the longer-term 
savings products. Stricter withdrawal penalties on these matched dollars can be considered, although the administrative costs could be 
substantial. 
18 The EITC match would need to be available to those who receive their refund over the course of the year as well as to those who 
choose to receive it once a year. 
19 The EITC savers bonus proposed by the New America Foundation allows a dollar-for-dollar match up to $500 (Boshara et al. 
2007). 
20 If the bond is redeemed before five years, there is a penalty—the three most recent months of interest are forfeited. 
21 These estimates assume 22.5 million families receive the EITC. In 2006, 22.4 million tax filers received the EITC. See IRS, “Earned 
Income Tax Credit Statistics,” http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=177571,00.html.  
22 IRS, “Plan Now to Get Full Benefit of Saver’s Credit; Tax Break Helps Low-and Moderate-Income Workers Save for Retirement,” 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=175591,00.html. 
23 There are no experimental studies of the effects of car ownership on employment and earnings. 
24 For specific proposals, see Carasso, Steuerle, and Bell (2005) and Gale and colleagues (2007). 
25 Increased regulation of nonbanks is consistent with President Bush’s Working Group on Financial Markets recent policy proposal 
that federal and state regulators strengthen oversight of all mortgage originators (Paulson 2008). 
26 Resources are the largest obstacle to FTC examinations, but additional authority could be helpful. The FTC’s consumer protection 
mission will provide examiners with the legal backdrop necessary, but additional language supporting “site visits” and “examinations” 
is recommended. 
27 Automatic IRAs were first proposed by Mark Iwry (Retirement Security Project) and David John (Heritage Foundation).  
28 That is, without action 1 percent of employees’ earnings would be automatically deposited into an IRA.  
29 To provide consistency across retirement savings vehicles, the employer tax credit could be expanded to include new and existing 
employers that set up an employer-sponsored retirement plan, such as a 401(k) or 403(b) plan. 
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COMMENT ON “ENABLING FAMILIES TO 
WEATHER EMERGENCIES AND DEVELOP” 
Edward N. Wolff 
New York University 
The McKernan-Ratcliffe paper considers the role of assets and debts in enabling low-income families to cope 
with financial exigencies. As the authors note, means-tested social welfare programs have not proven 
adequate to deal with most of the difficulties faced by these families. For example, only 22 percent of families 
with a low-income unemployed worker received any Unemployment Insurance benefit in 2006. In addition, 
the actual benefits received were in most cases inadequate to pay for the basic expenses of the family. The 
paper proposes asset policies to deal with financial emergencies. Such asset policies can also help families 
achieve long-term goals such as buying a house and providing for retirement. 
Almost all the policy proposals presented in the paper are excellent, and I am in agreement with them. 
However, as a general point, I think the authors should emphasize asset building more and debt policy less. 
With adequate financial savings, the need for short-term loans becomes much smaller. I think the general 
emphasis should be on providing refundable tax credits to low-income families as opposed to deductions since, 
as the authors note, the tax benefits from deductions for low-income families are rather minimal. These could 
be modeled after the earned income tax credit (EITC). In addition, these credits could be earmarked for 
specialized savings accounts like Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). For example, in the 2008 
presidential campaign, Barack Obama has proposed refundable tax credits in lieu of a deduction in the case of 
mortgage interest and property taxes. As the McKernan and Ratcliffe note, more than 99 percent of the 
dollars spent by the federal government to subsidize asset building are in the form of tax expenditures and 
less than 1 percent in direct outlays such as IDAs.  
I very much agree with the idea of further promoting IDAs and introducing children’s accounts as in the 
United Kingdom. However, I think that children’s accounts should remain tax free for all families as in 
Britain. It is hard to predict the socioeconomic status of children when they become adults. Also, having a 
universal benefit like social security will make the program easier to adopt politically. I also agree with the 
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proposal for the federal government to match EITC dollars that are deposited in savings accounts or used to 
buy U.S. savings bonds. I think this idea will enhance savings among low-income families.  
With regard to car ownership, I agree with McKernan and Ratcliffe that IDAs should be liberalized to allow 
car ownership. But I do not understand why the authors wish to exclude car insurance, since this is a major 
cost of car ownership and its cost may also limit the extent of car ownership among low-income families. As 
McKernan and Ratcliffe note, because of the approximately two to one match rate for an IDA withdrawal, 
the cap of $3,000 for the withdrawal translates into about a $9,000 limit for a car purchase. This seems 
sufficient to buy a decent car.  
I am also in agreement that mortgage loans from nonbanks should be subjected to the same rigorous bank 
examinations and oversight as those from commercial banks, which are currently regulated. Defaults on 
subprime mortgages are now reaching epidemic proportions, as are foreclosures on homes. Mortgages should 
be issued to prospective homebuyers only after a determination that the borrower can adequately repay the 
debt (I believe that most European countries have this regulation).  
I also think that McKernan and Ratcliffe should stress the negative home equity problem that is now 
occurring. Many low-income homeowners now have outstanding mortgage loans that are greater than their 
house values. (Some estimates are as high as 10 percent of all outstanding mortgages.) This feature has very 
negative effects on the ability of the family to sell its home (so-called “short sales”), since many banks and 
lending institutions will not approve such sales, particularly when there are multiple loans on the property. 
I also support a push for universal individual retirement accounts (IRAs). As the authors note, only 21 
percent of low-income working families have any retirement savings. Further, the median value of these 
accounts was only $10,000 in 2003—hardly enough to support their consumption for a single year! 
McKernan and Ratcliffe call for only the creation of automatic IRAs. The default option is that employee 
would be automatically enrolled in an IRA but the employee would still have the option of dropping out. As 
the authors note, studies have found that making the default option automatic enrollment in the system 
substantially increases participation. However, I would argue for a stronger provision that IRA enrollment be 
made mandatory (just like Social Security). Also, in the case when the employer does not provide any other 
retirement program I would make some kind of employer match (somewhere between 1 and 3 percent of the 
worker’s earnings) a mandatory part of this program. I think this feature is important because, as the authors 
report, an employee contributing 3 percent of his (or her) earnings would accumulate only $20,000 after 30 
years. This is barely equal to 200 percent of the federal poverty level for a two-person family. 
With regard to the advantages of asset ownership, the authors might note the work of Conley (1999), who 
found that wealth affected household behavior over and above income. This is particularly the case when 
accounting for behavioral differences between races. In particular, Conley argued that it was impossible to 
understand the persistence of racial inequality in the United States without examining black/white differences 
in wealth ownership. Conley set out to establish the need to go beyond the standard socioeconomic status 
indicators (education, occupation and income) in order to understand the causes of black/white inequality. 
He showed, for example, that the socioeconomic status indicators by themselves do not adequately explain 
differences in educational performance between black and white students; when wealth is included as an 
explanatory factor, much of the remaining gap in educational performance is accounted for. 
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WHEN TRADITIONAL ASSET BUILDING 
IS NOT ENOUGH 
A Comment on “Enabling Families to Weather Emergencies and Develop” 
Jessica Gordon Nembhard  
Howard University Center on Race and Wealth 
McKernan and Ratcliffe’s paper highlights the need to change budget priorities and focus more on helping 
low-income families gain assets. The authors’ engaging analysis is particularly important for policymakers as 
well as policy analysts, contributing to what we know about asset building among the low income, 
consequences of the problem, and potential policy solutions. Their cost-benefits analysis is particularly 
effective because often policy development and implementation-enforcement are a compromise between 
budget priorities and values, without rigorous evaluation. This is a thoughtful, practical proposal of how to 
extend traditional asset policies to low-income households.  
While ambitious along traditional lines, McKernan and Ratcliffe’s policy agenda proposes minimal moral 
imperatives but some pragmatic policies that have a chance of being supported in this political climate 
(though would still be considered by some to be too proactive and interventionist). Research and practice 
suggest that this is not enough to pull low-income households out of debt and into asset stability. By focusing 
on increasing savings levels and vehicle ownership among low-income families, McKernan and Ratcliffe do 
not sufficiently address the consumption needs and constraints, and savings limitations on low-income 
people. They also do not disaggregate their policy analyses or prescriptions by race or gender. The low 
income are not a homogeneous group, though most face similar constraints. McKernan and Ratcliffe’s policy 
menu, therefore, is missing additional strategies, such as collective ownership, to remedy such challenges as 
income and savings constraints, institutional racism, and racial and gender discrimination.  
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Some Considerations about the Savings Strategy 
On the face of it, saving and maintaining a positive credit rating are good strategies for anyone. No matter 
how supportive the savings products or how large the matches or long the tax deferral, however, it is 
unrealistic to expect people to take food out of their children’s mouths in order to start a savings account. 
Conventional wisdom assumes that low-income people do not save enough because they waste money and 
make the wrong consumption decisions. This ignores the reality that savings rates are not very different 
across classes and black-white savings rates are the same when income is controlled. In addition, the rising 
costs of basic necessities and stagnating wages and income transfers (FRAC 2008) render saving a serious 
challenge. Recent analyses such as Gorbachev (2007) reveal that consumption costs for housing, food, and 
utilities are disproportionately higher for those with the lowest incomes and have been increasing. 
To help low-income people build assets, one strategy is to first increase their disposable income by reducing 
the costs of necessities such as housing, energy, and food. This could be done through public subsidies or 
consumer cooperatives (energy and utility cooperatives, co-op grocery stores and pharmacies, cooperative 
farms, and housing cooperatives). Increasing household income is another way to increase disposable income, 
through, for example, living wages or a guaranteed family income. While some jurisdictions such as 
Baltimore, Maryland, have passed living wage ordinances, raising income is a difficult policy around which to 
form consensus. In sum, connections between income generation and cost-saving strategies and the ability to 
save and invest should not be ignored.  
Portfolio Span 
One weakness in the McKernan and Ratcliffe proposals is the lack of attention to portfolio composition and 
span in the process of wealth accumulation. Research on the composition of wealth portfolios finds that the 
wealth of the richest in the United States is diverse and its span wide. The wealthy are rich more because of 
business equity, the net worth of their stocks and bonds, and real estate equity than because of the equity in 
their own home. “Families who hold more complex portfolios tend to be wealthier than other families” 
(Chiteji, Gouskova, and Stafford 2006, 201). The median white family holds four elements in its wealth 
portfolio compared with two elements in the median black family’s portfolio (200). We also know that low-
income whites have more assets and higher levels of homeownership (as well as more inheritance) than 
people of color (Leigh 2006). While women do not do as well as men, the span of their portfolio is better 
than for African Americans (Chiteji et al. 2006, table 8.2). On the other hand, never-married women have the 
fewest assets and most family responsibilities, with African American women owning the least assets (Chang 
2006). These statistics are not broken down by income, but the trend is obvious. Policies need to be tailored 
by race and gender, not just by class, particularly because the causes and consequences of asset poverty differ 
by race and gender. 
An understanding of portfolio span is particularly important for wealth accumulation—growth, not just 
stability of assets. While realistically we care first about helping low-income people acquire an asset, if our 
ultimate aim is wealth accumulation and the elimination of asset poverty, a savings account or two will not be 
enough. We also need strategies to help low-income families, families of color, and women own (or at least 
benefit from) a variety of assets.1
McKernan and Ratcliffe do a good job discussing the tension between short- and long-term asset goals, but 
they do not explain well enough the need to divide savings between liquid assets that tend to be short term 
and can be used for emergencies, and illiquid assets that provide long-term stability and can be collateral for a 
loan. The asset/savings goal is to put the family in a position to take care of itself in an emergency and 
acquire an investment (house, business, etc.). Then the family only has to borrow as a last resort or when it 
will create more investment income and assets for the family.  
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Think Community 
It is difficult to imagine a complex wealth portfolio of low-income families. How can they manage such a feat 
with no disposable income, precarious economic condition, and susceptibility to economic and health shocks 
that reduce their income and savings further? While one strategy is to promote policies that facilitate the 
provision of a comprehensive social safety net, another approach is to examine the collective assets of a 
community and think about structures and mechanisms where pooled resources give people some economic 
stability, relative independence, and asset ownership, as well as the ability to help one another. Joint 
ownership is a stepping stone to individual/household wealth and an end in itself.  
The most traditional collective asset is the credit union. Community development financial institutions 
(CDFIs) and credit unions (CUs) are regulated financial institutions with track records of serving the 
underserved and low-income communities. As opposed to payday lenders, check cashing companies, and big 
banks, CUs, for example, provide quality financial services and products at an affordable price, and they are 
user friendly, community owned, and democratically governed. CUs and CDFIs also recirculate dollars—their 
savings and loans come from the community and are used in the community where they originate. Lower fees 
also mean more disposable income and ability to save for members. McKernan and Ratcliffe use credit 
unions as examples of financial institutions that provide small loans with savings but do not emphasize their 
importance as a major alternative financial services agency for low-income people, and as engines of asset 
building for low-income households. CUs and CDFIs are forms of community wealth and community-based 
mechanisms for asset building that public policies could support and expand. 
Members of a community can also own land, housing, and enterprises jointly and run businesses together 
with democratic structures. Cooperative housing reduces the costs of home ownership and maintenance. For 
low-income people, limited equity housing cooperatives and market-rate housing cooperatives serve the same 
purposes as condominiums but keep the housing affordable and combine small amounts of pooled resources 
with grants and loans. In this period of mortgage and housing crisis, with housing values down and interest 
rates declining, this could be the right time to institute responsible policies that increase low-income 
homeownership through co-op housing and use of credit unions as the mortgage lender.  
Worker-owned businesses, particularly worker cooperatives, which use employees’ pooled equity combined 
with loans (and sometimes grants for start-up), allow workers to own and often manage their own business, 
participate in democratic governance (one member one vote) and decide about work rules, business practices, 
and surplus distribution (profit sharing). These are also effective ways to provide low-income people with 
equity, for a small amount of investment (payable in installments) and reduced risk. 
The cooperative-joint ownership strategy extends to all kinds of assets including car and stock ownership. 
Gordon Nembhard (2002, 2004) provides examples. More policies and strategies to support cooperative 
institutions and joint ownership would help low-income families accumulate wealth through realistic, 
meaningful, and sustainable practices.  
Note 
 
1 For more about the variety of assets see Leigh (2006), and about the benefits of a complex portfolio see Chiteji and colleagues 
(2006). 
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